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Enforcing federal law seems simple enough. Federal agencies, 
which exist for exactly this purpose, enforce by identifying violations of 
a particular federal statutory scheme and accompanying regulations. 
But complications quickly arise. How should agencies enforce—by 
initiating judicial proceedings, by enacting rules or guidance to better 
define statutory proscriptions, by adjudicating matters within agencies, 
or by combining some or all of these powers? What role, if any, should 
federal courts have in adjudicating enforcement disputes or reviewing 
agency enforcement? Should only federal agencies be able to enforce 
federal law, or should state agencies or private parties also do so? And 
under what conditions? 
In Private Enforcement in Administrative Courts, Professor 
Michael Sant’Ambrogio meticulously catalogues various dynamic 
considerations for enforcement design—such as competition among 
political values, the effects of political and political-economic conditions, 
and constraints on financial and investigatory resources—to begin 
answering these questions.1 Of the many insights in his article, perhaps 
his most significant contribution is demonstrating that the very basic 
categories of how scholars typically envision enforcement schemes are 
incomplete. Courts, scholars, or both have discussed public and private 
enforcement in judicial proceedings and public enforcement.2 Yet with 
empirical data in hand, Sant’Ambrogio demonstrates that private 
 
 *  J. Alton Hosch Associate Professor, University of Georgia School of Law.  
 1. See Michael Sant’Ambrogio, Private Enforcement in Administrative Courts, 72 VAND. L. 
REV. 425 (2019). 
 2. See id. at 7–27. 
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enforcement in administrative proceedings is a robust form of 
enforcement that, despite or because of its undertheorized state, comes 
in numerous varieties.3 
Sant’Ambrogio argues that a hybrid private/public enforcement 
model in agency proceedings may provide the best hope of striking the 
proper balance among various values, considerations, and constraints 
to achieve optimal enforcement. 4 In other words, a blunderbuss 
approach of choosing public enforcement or private enforcement 
(whether in judicial or agency proceedings) is unlikely to prove ideal. 
Nuance is necessary. He identifies various tools—such as agencies’ role 
in the review or initiation of proceedings,5 or the use of class-wide 
proceedings6—that Congress or agencies can use to calibrate agency 
enforcement to its optimal design. 
In a similar vein, my purpose is to consider three additional tools 
that may optimize enforcement goals with hybrid public and private 
enforcement, whether inside or outside of administrative proceedings. 
Those tools are:  
(1) statutorily-mandated primary jurisdiction,  
(2) enforcement in either judicial or agency proceedings by state 
authorities, and 
(3) limits on federal preemption of concurrent state-law private 
causes of action.  
The first tool helps Congress balance the roles of agencies and 
courts. The latter two divide power between competing sovereigns in 
public and private enforcement. All three help provide Congress a more 
sophisticated toolbox when attempting to achieve optimal enforcement 
over a statutory scheme’s lifetime. Importantly, during that lifetime, 
the weight of competing values may shift based on politics, economic 
realities, or changing cultural mores, and these tools allow some 
dynamism in the enforcement design. 
Of course, numerous other tools deserve consideration. Yet, due 
to space constraints, I shall consider three that may be overlooked 
because, as with primary jurisdiction, they have fallen out of use7 or 
because, as with the latter two tools, they concern federalism, an often-
overlooked doctrine in discussions of federal administrative law.8  
 
 3. See id. at 23–27. 
 4. See id. at 5. 
 5. See id. at 23–27. 
 6. See id. at 56. 
 7. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Primary Jurisdiction: Another Victim of Reality, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 
431, 437 (2017) (noting that “[j]udicial invocations of primary jurisdiction have become rare”). 
 8. See Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism, 57 DUKE L.J. 2023, 
2026 (2008) (noting that “[f]ederalism and federal administrative law are an unfamiliar couple, 
particularly in Supreme Court precedent,” and arguing for courts to use administrative law to 
further federalism values). 
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I. DIFFICULTIES OF DESIGNING ENFORCEMENT 
As Sant’Ambrogio discusses in detail, designing enforcement 
regimes requires accounting for numerous competing considerations. 
Both public and private enforcement alone are often inadequate. Public 
enforcement alone is often insufficient because of limited agency 
resources to investigate and litigate all matters.9 Private enforcement 
alone can interfere with agencies’ ability to create a uniform, coherent 
approach to enforcement.10Likewise, judicial and administrative 
adjudication alone can prove unsatisfactory. Regardless of whether an 
enforcement regime relies on agencies or private parties, adjudication 
in judicial proceedings may inspire more confidence than in 
administrative proceedings because of judges’ perceived impartiality 
and judicial proceedings’ perceived fairness.11 That confidence, 
however, may come at the cost of an agency’s adjudicatory subject-
matter expertise.12 A marriage of private and public enforcement inside 
and outside of agencies can, if properly balanced, have the benefit of 
mitigating an agency’s lack of resources, provide additional information 
to the agency, and buttress the legitimacy of the enforcement regime.13 
Nonetheless, value balancing can prove especially difficult 
because of empirical questions over a particular value’s significance. 
For instance, as Sant’Ambrogio recognizes, little empirical evidence 
supports the intuition that expertise promotes efficiency and better 
decisionmaking.14 If anything, the limited empirical evidence cuts 
against the intuition.15 And, of course, politicians or administrators 
may simply prefer one value—such as efficiency or adjudicatory 
 
 9. See Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 1, at 2, 5, 9–10. 
 10. See id. at 14–15. 
 11. See id. at 32–33. As I have discussed elsewhere, many administrative adjudicators have 
fewer protections from agency influence than judges or federal administrative law judges (“ALJs”). 
Depending on the particular group of non-ALJ adjudicators, an agency may allow ex parte 
contacts, performance reviews and performance bonuses, and combined functions within the 
agency. See generally Kent Barnett & Russell Wheeler Non-ALJ Adjudicators in Federal Agencies: 
Status, Selection, Oversight, and Removal, 53 GA. L. REV. 1 (2019) (providing survey data on the 
hiring and oversight of non-ALJs); Kent Barnett Against Administrative Judges, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 1643 (2016) (arguing that ALJs, based on their indicia of impartiality as compared to non-
ALJs, are preferable). Indeed, the characteristics that influence a non-ALJ adjudicator’s actual or 
perceived impartiality are often difficult to ascertain. See generally Kent Barnett Some Kind of 
Hearing Officer, 94 WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (proposing that agencies provide and post a 
one-page disclosure concerning the characteristics that concern their various adjudicators’ 
impartiality). 
 12. See id. at 34–37. 
 13. See id. at 9–10.  
 14. See id. at 35. 
 15. See Joshua D. Wright & Angela M. Diveley, Do Expert Agencies Outperform Generalist 
Judges? Some Preliminary Evidence from the Federal Trade Commission, 1 J. ANTITRUST 
ENFORCEMENT 82 (2013) (finding that the decisions of generalist federal trial judges fare better 
than those of FTC administrative law judges on appeal). 
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independence—over another and thus have different conceptions of 
optimal enforcement. 
Relatedly, it is often difficult to know how administrative tools 
can foster or hinder a particular value over time. Consider the goal of 
permitting accountable agencies to create coherent enforcement 
policies. Agencies lose some control if courts, as opposed to agencies, 
entertain and decide enforcement actions. But agencies still have other 
ways of coordinating enforcement strategy. For example, they can 
promulgate policy statements to guide agency-enforcement discretion,16 
substantive regulations to specify the underlying statute’s 
requirements that have the force of law,17 and interpretive or notice-
and-comment rules to clarify ambiguous statutory provisions (which 
may be entitled to Chevron deference even after a court has interpreted 
that provision differently18).19 Nevertheless, the quantum of control 
that these tools provide is neither susceptible to mathematical 
exactness nor fixed in intensity over the course of a statutory scheme. 
In short, Congress must necessarily weigh various considerations 
without perfect information and within a dynamic ecosystem of 
administrative options.  
Even when Congress appropriately weighs these values and 
understands the effect of administrative tools, statutory schemes are 
not self-enforcing. The efficacy of enforcement depends on ever-
changing factors. If regulated industry has “captured” the enforcing 
agency, the enforcing agency is less likely to initiate investigations or 
adjudications, or to seek meaningful remedies for violations.20 Agency 
political appointees may also have different value judgments than the 
enacting Congress, leading to over- or under-enforcement, as compared 
to the enacting legislature’s intent.21 Finally, aside from political 
appointees’ policy views, the agency bureaucracy may simply prove 
ossified and unable to respond nimbly to new practices that cause 
harms that the statutory scheme seeks to avoid.22 
II. TOOLS FOR OPTIMAL ENFORCEMENT 
Sant’Ambrogio moves the discussion over how to achieve optimal 
enforcement forward by conceptualizing enforcement models in four key 
ways: public enforcement in either judicial or administrative 
 
 16. See Mada-Luna v. Fitzpatrick, 813 F.2d 1006, 1012–13 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 17. See Warder v. Shalala, 149 F.3d 73, 79–81 (1st Cir. 1998). 
 18. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand-X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005). 
 19. See id. 
 20. See, e.g., Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 1, at 11, 39–40. 
 21. See id. at 11. 
 22. See id. 
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proceedings, and private enforcement in either judicial or 
administrative proceedings. His significant contribution is considering 
how enforcement in agency proceedings is often hybrid in nature—
permitting or requiring both public and private participation. Coming 
in different varieties, hybrid enforcement may have the most promise 
in creating optimal enforcement regimes. He also notes how different 
forms of hybrid enforcement can affect underlying values. For instance, 
permitting private parties to file complaints only with the agency’s 
blessing can permit an agency to prevent enforcement yet provide the 
agency more control.23  
My purpose here is to consider how additional tools—some that 
directly relate to hybrid enforcement in administrative proceedings and 
some that do not—may prove useful in achieving optimal enforcement. 
A. Primary Jurisdiction  
The first tool is statutorily mandated primary jurisdiction. 
Primary jurisdiction, in its most usual form, is a discretionary doctrine 
similar to abstention, where courts can stay litigation to permit an 
agency to choose to decide an issue first.24 Although the Supreme Court 
has stated that “[n]o fixed formula exists for applying [primary 
jurisdiction],”25 courts typically consider the relevance of agency 
expertise26 and the need for uniformity.27 Despite primary jurisdiction’s 
prominence as a judicially crafted doctrine, statutes can mandate its 
use by requiring private parties to present an enforcement action to the 
relevant agency before proceeding in court. One flavor of statutory 
primary jurisdiction already governs Title VII claims. Private parties 
must first present their claims to the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (“EEOC”). They can file a civil action in court only if the 
EEOC does not act within 180 days, declines to file its own civil action, 
or fails to reach a settlement agreement with the implicated parties.28  
 
 23. See id. at 23–25, 53. 
 24. 2 RICHARD J. PIERCE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 14.1, 1161–62 (5th ed. 2010). 
 25. United States v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 64 (1956). 
 26. See id. 
 27. Far E. Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574–75 (1952) (quoted in Nader v. 
Allegheny Airlines Inc., 426 U.S. 290, 304–05 (1976)). 
 28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2018) (“If a charge filed with the [Equal Employment 
Opportunity] Commission . . . is dismissed by the Commission, or if within one hundred and eighty 
days from the filing of such charge or the expiration of any period of reference under subsection (c) 
or (d), whichever is later, the Commission has not filed a civil action under this section . . .  or the 
Commission has not entered into a conciliation agreement to which the person aggrieved is a party, 
the Commission . . . shall so notify the person aggrieved and within ninety days after the giving of 
such notice a civil action may be brought against the respondent named in the charge (A) by the 
person claiming to be aggrieved . . . .”); see also PIERCE, supra note 24, § 14.1, at 1166 (discussing 
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Much like administrative adjudication, primary jurisdiction can 
come in numerous varieties. It may, as with Title VII, give agencies the 
chance to assert their own judicial action or attempt to settle the matter 
voluntarily with the parties.29 But it could, as is common, permit 
agencies to decide matters in administrative adjudication.30 The ability 
to hear matters in administrative adjudication permits agencies to 
decide to what degree they would like to provide, or scale back, 
adjudicatory resources or procedures for in-house determination based 
on the agency’s priorities, enforcement strategy, or caseload volatility. 
Primary jurisdiction is an extremely promising tool for 
recognizing the benefits of both public and private enforcement. Its 
raison d’être is to recognize the importance of agency expertise, 
uniformity, and coherent regulatory policy.31 Because primary 
jurisdiction does not ordinarily require the agency to litigate the 
matter,32 it also recognizes limitations on agencies’ resources or 
preferences for particular enforcement vehicles. Even if agencies 
decline to decide the matter, they are still able to obtain information 
from private parties that agencies may not otherwise have learned. 
Agencies can also decide whether to expend some of their litigation 
resources in participating in some manner in judicial proceedings. 
Private parties can obtain a forum regardless of agencies’ decisions, and 
private parties and their lawyers can provide additional, private 
resources to aid public enforcement. These private-party actions can 
also curb the effects of regulatory capture by providing additional 
enforcing parties and judicial oversight. At the same time, by giving the 
agency the ability to decide the matter or encourage settlement outside 
of court, primary jurisdiction and other similar pre-suit requirements 
promote judicial efficiency and provide a mechanism for limiting the 
number of private suits.33 
 
Title VII’s provisions as a rare statutory mandate for congressional requirement for primary 
jurisdiction). 
 29. Even if finding reasonable cause to support a discrimination claim, the EEOC is not 
required to file a civil claim. See Brandon Wheeler, Note, Amending Title VII to Safeguard the 
Viability of Retaliation Claims, 98 MINN. L. REV. 775, 780 n.39 (2013) (citing Civil Action By the 
Commission, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.27 (2018)). 
 30. See, e.g., S. Prairie Constr. Co. v. Local 627, Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, 425 U.S. 800, 
806 (1976) (per curiam) (referring question of representational status for collective bargaining to 
the National Labor Relations Board); Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe v. Wicker, 39 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 
1994) (referring question of group’s status as a tribe to the Bureau of Indian Affairs).  
 31. See Pierce, supra note 7, at 436; see also Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 1, at 42–47 (describing 
value of having agency implement coherent enforcement policy).  
 32. See Owner-Operator Ind. Drivers Ass’n v. New Prime, 192 F.3d 778, 785–86 (8th Cir. 
1999). 
 33. Cf. Hallstrom v. Tillamook Cty., 493 U.S. 20, 29 (1989) (“[T]he legislative history indicates 
an intent [with 60-day pre-suit notice obligations under the Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act of 1976] to strike a balance between encouraging citizen enforcement of environmental 
regulations and avoiding burdening the federal courts with excessive numbers of citizen suits.”). 
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Despite its promise, primary jurisdiction does have some 
potential drawbacks. First, it slows down private enforcement by 
requiring time for agency consideration.34 Prominent scholar Richard 
Pierce attributes concern over litigatory lethargy as the reason for 
courts’ increasing reluctance to use the doctrine.35 Second, private-
party enforcement can hamper agencies’ enforcement strategies by 
permitting actions to proceed that agencies have determined may 
create unhelpful law or cause over-enforcement as to relatively minor 
matters.36 Yet, good statutory design can mitigate, even if not fully cure, 
these concerns. Time limitations, as with Title VII claims, on agency 
review, for example, can help keep litigation moving.37 To combat 
disruption to agencies’ regulatory agendas, agencies can intervene in 
judicial proceedings to ensure that courts are aware of their views, 
especially their disfavor of particular cases or novel legal 
interpretations.38 Indeed, agencies can also turn to notice-and-comment 
regulations that have the force of law and can even overcome certain 
judicial legal interpretations.39  
B. State and Federal Enforcement 
Aside from using primary jurisdiction to allocate responsibility 
horizontally between federal courts and agencies, Congress can also 
allocate authority vertically among sovereigns. By permitting state-led 
public enforcement in either state agency or judicial proceedings 
(concurrent with federal public enforcement), Congress can mitigate 
two concerns over federal agency enforcement. First, the presence of 
other actors to enforce federal statutory schemes reduces the risks or 
 
Similar pre-suit notice requirements are fairly common in federal litigation. See, e.g., Toxic 
Substances Claims Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619(b)(1)(A)-(B) (2018); Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1540(g)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii) (2018); Federal Torts Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2675 (2018); False Claims Act, 
31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) (2018); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A)-(B) (2018). 
 34. See Pierce, supra note 7, at 436 (“Invocation of the primary jurisdiction doctrine has one 
major disadvantage: it has the potential to delay resolution of the dispute before the court.”). 
 35. See id. at 436–37. 
 36. See, e.g., Diana R. H. Winters, Restoring the Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine, 78 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 541, 594–95 (2017) (concluding that discretionary “referrals” to the agency under the doctrine 
of primary jurisdiction potentially infringe on agencies’ domain of determining their own 
procedures). 
 37.  Although mandated primary jurisdiction that requires agency review before judicial 
consideration does delay a party’s access to court, it does so in a way that does not clog judicial 
dockets because the agency proceedings must conclude before a party can file a judicial action. 
 38. Indeed, Pierce notes that “[c]ourts routinely ask agencies to submit amicus briefs in which 
the agencies apprise courts of their interpretations of agency-administered statutes, rules, and 
tariffs.” See Pierce, supra note 8, at 437. 
 39. See supra notes 17–19 and accompanying text. 
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reality of regulatory capture.40 Even if regulated entities have created 
incentives for federal regulatory actors to eschew enforcement actions, 
state actors are able to fill the void. Second, state enforcement 
supplements resource-challenged federal agencies.  
As Sant’Ambrogio discusses, the use of private enforcement can 
present its own problems. Private enforcement can undermine an 
agency’s uniform policy and lead to over-enforcement. Private parties 
may have very different incentives than regulators. They may have 
stronger pecuniary interests in litigating or have an oversized sense of 
the importance of the regulated entity’s alleged transgression than 
agencies that see numerous cases.41  
Other public actors, however, may provide a better antidote to 
concerns over regulatory capture and limited resources than private 
parties. State regulators, like their federal counterparts, are politically 
accountable and thus provide some necessary democratic legitimacy in 
defining how to go about protecting the “public interest.”42 Indeed, 
depending on the state, those state regulators may have even more 
political accountability than federal regulators if the head of the 
enforcing agency is elected.43 State enforcers, also like their federal 
counterparts, have the opportunity to learn of numerous alleged 
violations in their jurisdictions and prioritize their efforts accordingly. 
To be sure, state regulators, like federal regulators, may also be subject 
to regulatory capture, especially given state agencies’ comparative lack 
of media and other civic oversight.44 But a regulated industry’s ability 
to capture fifty state agencies is a more complicated enterprise, 
requiring significant coordination and resources, than capturing one 
federal agency or key federal legislators, such as congressional 
committee chairs. 
 
 40. See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional 
Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 56–58 (2010). 
 41. See Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 1, at 13–14.  
 42. Cf. id. at 13 (noting that private enforcement lacks political accountability that is focused 
on the “public interest”).  
 43. See Christopher R. Berry & Jacob E. Gersen, The Unbundled Executive, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1385, 1399–1401 (2008) (comparing the nature of “unbundled executives”—through state-wide or 
local elections—in the states). Berry and Gersen challenge the perceived wisdom that plural 
executives are less politically accountable than a unitary executive. They argue that political 
accountability suffers with plural executives whose duties overlap because the electorate may be 
confused as to which executive was responsible for a particular policy. But when the plural 
executives have clear, separate authority, the electorate is better able to hold that official 
accountable for his or her actions. Indeed, voting for a unitary executive is a much cruder affair in 
which the electorate has to weigh its satisfaction with numerous, unrelated policies. Id. at 1403–
05. 
 44. See Miriam Seifter, Further From the People? The Puzzle of State Administration, 93 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 107, 148 (2018). 
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The states’ role need not interfere with the federal agencies’ 
regulatory priorities to a significant degree. Take state enforcement of 
federal financial law under Title 12 of the U.S. Code as a comprehensive 
example. Except in emergencies, state officials must notify relevant 
federal regulators of their intent to file a civil action or administrative 
proceeding and provide them with the to-be-filed complaint.45 The 
notice must specifically include “whether there may be a need to 
coordinate the prosecution of the proceeding so as not to interfere with 
any action, including any rulemaking, undertaken by [federal 
regulators].”46 The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) 
can elect to intervene, meaning that it may be “heard on all matters 
arising in the action,” remove the matter to federal court, and appeal 
any order or judgment as any other party might.47 Finally, the CFPB 
has specific rulemaking authority over state-and-federal coordination.48  
In addition, Congress limited the kinds of permissible state 
enforcement under Title 12 to account for federal policymaking. First, 
it limited the regulated entities subject to state-enforcement 
authorities: in short, state attorneys general alone can assert claims 
against national banking entities, while state regulators (along with 
state attorneys general) can do so only against state entities.49 Second, 
Congress distinguished the kinds of claims that the state authorities 
can bring. In short, state authorities can assert claims under Title 12 
and CFPB regulations promulgated under it against state entities,50 
but state attorneys general can assert claims against national entities 
for only violations of CFPB regulations, not standalone statutory 
violations.51 These distinctions give states less enforcement authority 
over national entities—those in which the federal agencies have the 
most interest—in two ways. It requires higher profile state actors (state 
attorneys general, as compared to other state regulators) to sue. By 
having attorneys general enforce, Congress has chosen other salient 
political actors who are less likely to suffer from the tunnel vision that 
can lead to agency over-enforcement and that may undermine federal 
priorities.52 Congress, perhaps more importantly, has limited the 
attorneys general from pushing novel legal interpretations by 
prohibiting them from suing national banks directly under the statute. 
Instead, the attorneys general may only enforce certain federal 
 
 45. 12 U.S.C. § 5552(b)(1)(A)-(B) (2018).  
 46. See id. § 5552(b)(1)(C)(iii). 
 47. Id. § 5552(b)(2). 
 48. See id. § 5552(c). 
 49. See id. § 5552(a)(1). 
 50. See id.  
 51. See id.; id. § 5552(a)(2). 
 52. See Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 1, at 49. 
136 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:127 
regulations under the statute, thereby cabining the litigation discretion 
and rendering it more likely that state enforcement will not undermine 
federal objectives.53 
C. State-Law Causes of Action 
As part of allocation authority among sovereigns, Congress can 
create a framework for encouraging state experimentation for private 
enforcement. To be sure, Congress can include private rights of 
enforcement directly in the federal statutory schemes that it creates. 
Federal private causes of action can allay the risk of agency capture and 
supplement federal litigation resources.54 But recall that private 
enforcement may lead to over-enforcement or disruption to a reticulated 
regulatory agenda.55 A middle ground exists between an all-or-nothing 
approach that either creates or prohibits a federal cause of action. 
Congress can give states and agencies space to fashion bespoke state-
law causes of action that further federal objectives. 
A prime example arises in the consumer-protection context. The 
Federal Trade Commission Act allows the Federal Trade Commission 
to enforce the act’s prohibition on unfair and deceptive trade practices.56 
It does not create a private right of action for consumers harmed by 
deceptive or unfair trade practices.57 But every state provides 
consumers private rights of action, although the predicates for the 
actions and the associated remedies vary widely among the 
jurisdictions.58 Many of these statutes instruct courts to interpret the 
statute consistently with the Federal Trade Commission Act, creating 
more regulatory cohesion between federal and state law.59 Without 
providing a federal cause of action, Congress has taken some pressure 
off federal dockets and allowed states to have a more significant role in 
enforcing consumer protections.  
When Congress fears that regulatory interests have captured a 
federal agency, simply leaving state causes of action as an option may 
prove insufficient. A captured federal agency could seek to limit 
 
 53. See id. at 13 (noting that private parties may assert novel legal interpretations that are 
contrary to an agency’s interpretations or agenda). 
 54. See id. at 9–11. 
 55. See id. at 14, 63. 
 56. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2018) (“[U]nfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting 
commerce[] are hereby declared unlawful.”). 
 57. Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
 58. See, e.g., DEE PRIDGEN & RICHARD M. ALDERMAN, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE LAW 
§§ 6:2, 6:10 (2018 ed. 2018). 
 59. See, e.g., GA. CODE § 10-1-391(b) (West 2010) (“It is the intent of the General Assembly 
that this part be interpreted and construed consistently with interpretations given by the Federal 
Trade Commission in the federal courts . . . .”); accord TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 17.46(c)(1).  
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concurrent state action by preempting state laws by broadly 
determining that state law is inconsistent or otherwise an obstacle to 
federal law. Indeed, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(“OCC”) did just that in response to potent consumer-finance state laws 
in the early 2000s.60 In the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Congress limited the OCC’s ability to 
preempt certain laws.61 Congress permitted the OCC to preempt certain 
consumer-finance state laws on a case-by-case basis only after 
satisfying numerous detailed statutory requirements and less-
deferential-than-usual judicial review.62 It even required the OCC to 
review its preemption decisions every five years and to notify relevant 
congressional committees of its review.63 In a similar context with the 
CFPB, Congress has gone so far as to permit federal preemption based 
on the inconsistency of state and federal law while clarifying that 
inconsistency does not arise merely because state laws provide greater 
consumer protections than federal law.64  
These examples from consumer-protection law demonstrate how 
private enforcement under state law can prove useful in mitigating 
concerns over capture and limited federal resources. It can do so while 
giving agencies some room to preempt state law that is inconsistent or 
is an obstacle to the federal law’s purpose,65 even if Congress requires 
the agency to satisfy various procedural hurdles to permit more 
transparency and easier monitoring. State-law private enforcement, 
accordingly, is another tool that Congress can permit in varying degrees 
to create an optimal enforcement regime.  
*** 
Sant’Ambrogio makes a valuable contribution in demonstrating 
that public and private enforcement occur in more ways than often 
appreciated. He has very helpfully identified numerous considerations 
that affect enforcement regimes and the kinds of enforcement-regime 
designs that favor one consideration over others. By doing so, he has 
provided a foundation for thinking more deeply about enforcement and 
administrative-adjudication design. 
 
 60. See Kent Barnett, Codifying Chevmore, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 22–26 (2015). 
 61. Id. at 26–30. 
 62. 12 U.S.C. § 25b (2018). 
 63. Id. § 25b(d). 
 64. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C § 5551(a)(2) (concerning federal preemption by CFPB); see also Barkow, 
supra note 40, at 54 (“If the concern is that a federal agency will be captured by one-sided industry 
interests at the expense of the general public, there is value in making federal regulations a floor 
and allowing states to enact laws that are even more protective of the public.”). 
 65. See 12 U.S.C. § 25b(1)(B) (expressly adopting the obstacle-preemption standard of 
Barnett Bank of Marion Cty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996)). 
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Through this brief essay that identifies three enforcement tools, 
I have sought to further Sant’Ambrogio’s work and provide additional 
nuance into how private and public enforcement can take different 
shapes, depending on Congress’s concerns. When Congress trusts the 
enforcing agency, Congress can, for example, permit the agency to have 
the first opportunity to address the infraction at issue through primary 
jurisdiction. On the flip side, when Congress has less trust in an agency 
or concerns over the resources that it seeks to invest in the agency’s 
enforcement, Congress can permit the states to assist through either 
public or private enforcement to add other enforcing actors and 
enforcement resources. 
My discussion here is but a beginning. I look forward to 
Sant’Ambrogio’s and others’ identification of additional tools to craft 
effective enforcement regimes. But until then, I am appreciative of 
Sant’Ambrogio’s efforts to provide a theoretical framework for thinking 
more deeply about the nature of agencies and enforcement. 
 
